





















BUILD-TO-ORDER IS NOT THAT EASY:  
ADDING VOLUME FLEXIBILITY TO MASS CUSTOMIZATION 
Fabricio Salvador    Manus Rungtusanatham    Cipriano Forza     Alessio Trentin 
IE Working Paper        DO8-119-I                 04 / 05 / 2004 
Abstract 
The present paper reports preliminary observations from a longitudinal case study of
the Lawn Mowers & Garden Tract ors business unit of Deere & C ompany.  This
business unit is interested in analyzing the applicability of a Build-To-Order strategy 
for its business.  By analyzing the problems related to the simultaneous pursuit of
volume and mix flexibility we propose a model explaining how these two trade-offs 
can be simultaneously addressed.  We then speculate about the compatibility of the 
techniques generally advocated to address either volume or mix flexibility, in this
case where these two trade-offs have to be jointly reduced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From consumer electronics (Trommer &  Robertson, 1997) to automobile  (Howard et 
al., 2001) to apparel (Aiclmyr, 2001), firms in these and many more industries are being 
encouraged to adopt what the popular press has dubbed B uild-to-Order (BTO) in order 
to  efficiently  and  effectively  manage  the  increasing  market  volume  and m ix 
uncertainties that are being levied on these firms.  Building products to order, in a literal 
sense, means aligning the product creation and order fulfillment processes to specific 
customer ordering requirements, usually by adopting one or more approaches described 
in  the  Operations  Management  lexicon  such as Assemble-to-Order, Make-to-Order, 
and/or Purchase-to-Order (see Kraemer et al., 2000; Svennsson & Barford, 2002).   
What is driving these manufacturing firms to BTO is the real need to reduce the financial and 
commercial risks stemming from trying to serve uncertain consumer markets – uncertainty in 
terms of both market volume and mix – with finished g oods inventories.  As uncertainties in 
market volume and product mix increases, the risks that these manufacturing firms face increases 
tremendously.  Not only do they face the costly risk of unsold finished goods inventory sitting in a 
warehouse and/or distribution center, but they also face the risk of missing  out on commercial 
opportunities because one or more products offered in their mix that are selling are not available in 
finished goods inventory.  BTO promises to reduce not only  these risks but also the internal 
operational performance tradeoffs that manufacturing firms typically face between being flexible 
in terms of production volume or being flexible in terms of production mix. 
Hence, for manufacturing firms transforming to BTO, this strategic imperative signals a 
major  departure  from the traditional Make-to-Stock approach, ty pical  of mass 
production, where batches of various products are produced in relatively  high quantity 
and often in advance of demand.  As Holweg  & Frits (2001) suggested, becoming BTO 
will necessitate a rethinking, in an integrated fashion, both how products are  designed 
and offered to customers and how processes responsible for delivery  of these products 
are designed.  Undoubtedly, past research on how manufacturing firms can successfully 
achieve product mix flexibility (e.g., Berry & Cooper, 1999; Shanling & Tirupati, 1997) 
or volume flexibility (e.g., Khouja, 1997; Jack & Raturi, 2002) will be most informative 
in  facilitating  this  transformation,  if  and  only  if  the  choice  was  between  pursuing 
product mix flexibility versus volume flexibility but not both.  What BTO requires is the 
pursuit of both product mix  flexibility and production volume flex ibility in order to 
counteract market volume and mix  uncertainties.  Herein  lies a major gap in literature.  
At present, we do not know what innovations and changes must a manufacturing firm 
make to the way existing products and manufacturing processes are designed in order 
to successfully transform to BTO.  Furthermore, since product desig n, process design, 
and supply chain design decisions have to be integrated to support one another (F ine, 
1998) and since firm performances can be dramatically  impacted by performances of 
supply  chain partners,  we must also understand what innovations and changes must a 
manufacturing firm make in configuring its supply chain to support the transformation to BTO.   
To provide insights into the two questions raised above, we propose to engage in longitudinal case 
research to study the transformation and evolution of the L awn Mowers and Garden  Tractors 
Business Group (LMGT) of Deere &  Company. This particular business g roup is ideal as a 
research setting given the corporate decision to pursue a “Build-to-Order” competitive strategy. 1.   METHOD 
We developed an interview protocol of open-ended questions to be answered by  key 
personnel at the Horicon WI facility.  Working with company mangers, we identified 
and  targeted  the plant manag er,  the accounting   manager,  relevant product  design 
engineers,  relevant  manufacturing  process  engineers,  relevant supply   management 
specialists, and one critical 1
st-tier supplier for interview data collection.  Interviews 
were conducted onsite by 2 or more members of the research team and were taped  (a) to 
avoid loss of information or distortion of meaning  and (b) to allow for an assessment 
and verification of content validity  after transcription.  During  interviews, supporting 
archival documents and records (e.g., design specifications, workforce policies, plant 
layouts,  promotional  materials,  etc.)  were  collected  for  triangulation  with inte rview 
data.    Taped  interviews  were subsequently   transcribed, checked for transcription 
integrity, and triangulated against archival data. 
With the interviews concluded, we performed intra-case analyses adopting the coding 
techniques recommended by Strauss (1987).  We first clustered interview data into large 
conceptual categories (open coding) and subsequently identified sub-categories (axial 
coding), according to an indented coding  scheme (see R ubin, 1995).  The purpose of 
these analyses is to gain a clear understanding of the different contexts embedded within 
the  cases and t o  identify  the  main  themes  and/or  variables  relevant  to  the  research 
agenda. 
 
2.  THE BUSINESS UNIT AND ITS COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 
John  Deere’s L awn  Mowers and Garden Tractors B usiness  Group operates in  the 
Outdoor Power Equipment industry , which includes the L awn and Garden Equipment 
industry.  Although it exports to over 60 countries, its main market  is the US. The US 
Lawn and Garden equipment market is a highly competitive one, for multiple reasons. 
First of all, it is big  enough to attract strong  manufacturers, as it was approximately 
worth $12 billion in 2002.  Consequently , it cannot be considered a business populated 
by niche manufacturers that can enjoy relatively generous margins as small market size 
preempts  the  competition of larg e  manufacturing  corporations.  Second, it has been 
growing very slowly from late 90s throug h the early 2000s, and such trend has been 
exacerbated  by  economic slowdown in 2001.   Nevertheless,  the  Lawn  and  Garden 
Equipment market is expected to be steadily growing in the future, under the  combined 
effect  of ag ing  baby  boomers and ex ploding  housing  market.    From  a  distribution 
standpoint,  approximately  70%  of retail is controlled by   home centers (e.g .  Home 
Depot) and discounters (e.g. Wal-Mart).  Needless to say , the huge market power of 
these  large  distributors tends to shrink  manufacturers’  margins.    Finally,  from  a 
technological standpoint, Lawn and Garden Equipment industry  entry barriers are low 
as its main product, the lawn/g arden tractor, is mature.  L awn/garden tractors, in fact, 
mostly incorporate well known automotive and mechanical technologies.  
 2.1 Seasonality 
The  Lawn  and  Garden  Equipment industry   is structurally   affected by   a severe 
seasonality.  Most of customers sales concentrate in spring and early summer, as people 
either buy L&G equipment when they need it or they  are likely to postpone purchase.   
In the specific case of the plant under analy sis, gross market demand typically displays 
1:7 variation, when we compare the month with lowest demand level with the peak 
month.  Figure 1 illustrates demand variation in 2001 for a product family manufactured 
within  such  plant.  Althoug h  other product families may   display  different variation 
ranges (from 1:4 up to 1:10), the demand pattern is the same, i.e. we have m ost of 
demand in spring and summer. 
Unexpected weather conditions may affect the shape of t he aggregated demand curve, 
for  example  shifting  it  forward or backwards  in  time.    Unpredictable  weather 
conditions, therefore, add a dimension of uncertainty to the complex  task of serving a 
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Figure 1: Aggregate monthly demand variation for one of the product families manufactured within the 
plant under study 
 
2.2 Segmentation 
A  second source of complex ity  and uncertainty   in serving   the L awn  and  Garden 
Equipment market is related to the heterogeneity of customer needs.  A f irst essential 
distinction is that one between Lawn and Garden tractors.  Lawn tractors are essentially 
intended  as  lawn  mowing  machines.  They can be used to perform other g ardening 
work, such as throwing snow and towing small utility carts.  On the other side, garden 
tractors can be seen as a scal ed-down version of the tractor used in agriculture, as they 
have a significant plowing capability, they can till relatively heavy carts, can work as 
front loaders, etc. besides the greater versatility and operational capabilities (e.g. see 
Figure 2a), these machines are more robust and more  durable than lawn tractors (see 
Figure  2b).   Ne edless  to sa y,  different  operational  capability  and  durability  imply 
different price, which can roughly range from $2,000 (entry-level riders) up to $12,000 
(top-of-the-line X series). For  each  product  family  –  namely  riding  mowers, LT-LTR,  SST,  LX,  GT, GX300, 
X400, X500 – a set of product models can  be selected by the customer.  Typically 
product variants differ across a product family  in terms of engine power and brand, 
mower deck size, mower deck engaging mechanism, tire size and other accessories such 
as cruise control, hour meter, etc. 
Finally,  once  a  customer has chosen a product model within a certain family   can 
customize  it  with  appropriate  attachments,  such as g rass  collection  system,  snow 
thrower/blower, sprayers, etc.  Assortment of attachments is wider for more powerful 
and expensive models, while it is more limited for simpler, cheaper and less powerful 
models. 
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Figure 2: Product differentiation in terms of area to mow and durability 
 
2.3 Product change 
A third source of complexity is related to the fact that product families are subject to 
significant  variation  across  time.   As la wn/garden  tractors  are  essentially  mature 
products,  product chang e  can be minimally   related to the  incorporation  of  new 
technology.  Hence, the market is the fundamental driver of product change. 
In  understanding  how market dy namics  affect product offer across  time we have to 
discern  two  different  factors.  On the one hand product chang e  is driven by   the 
evolution of customer needs, meant both in terms of end  customers and retailers.  On 
the other hand, product change is the byproduct of marketing decision means to tackle 
on the short term actions taken by competitors. 
As for the evolution of customer needs is concerned, we have to disting uish between 
customers  and retailers.  Customers may   look  at  a  lawn/garden  tractor  with  very 
different eyes.  Some customers may take gardening as a matter of pride and “prestige” 
in their neighborhood, while other see g ardening as “a chore”.  Such attitudes towards 
gardening  work  translate  into  different  requirements  and  willingness  to spe nd  on 
gardening equipment.  As customers become more and more aware of what  they like 
and dislike, companies in the Lawn and Gardening Equipment industry moved toward 
offering more and more product variety .  John Deer Lawn and Garden Business Group is no exception to such trend, as the number of product families jumped from 3 in the 
early 80s up to 10 in the early 2000s (see Table 1). 
On  the  other  side,  the  evolution  of distribution channels, with the establishment of 
powerful retail chains and of speci alty stores further emphasized the effect of greater 
customer  heterogeneity.   Home centers and discounters concentrated on  the  mass 
market  and, to some ex tent  contributed to develop it.    The  mass  market  typically 
absorbs entry-level models and it is e xtremely price sensitive.  Price sensitivity and 
volume justify the development of ad-hoc products and brands to serve such kind of 
retailers.  On the other side, specialty stores and dealers focus on more up-scaled models 
and more demanding customers.  The price premium customers are willing to pay, as 
well  as  their  ability  to e ngage  in comparisons with competing tractors, commanded 
companies competing on this segment to provide an adequate. 
Finally, the very dynamics of competition across different manufacturers of Lawn and 
Garden Equipment led marketing organizations to further proliferate  product variety in 
order to keep the pace with competition and to try  to differentiate product  offer.  For 
example, in order to match competition John Deere is offering both a 20hp a 22hp and a 
21 hp Kawasaki gasoline engine.  Overall, its tractor product families use a total of 16 
totally different engines over 37 models!  Other product change may require styling and 
product distinctiveness.  F or example, to emphasize the 0-turning-radius capability of 
SST, it comes with its own spe cific steering wheel, made in two c olors unlike all the 
other steering wheels, which are black.  The need to frequently  update and revise the 
product offer is now reflected in a continuous product change.  
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Table 1: Evolution of product families 
3. PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 
Although lawn/garden tractors may substantially differ in the components from which 
they  are actually   built, it is possible  to  approximately  identify  a  typical  product 
architecture  that  is  mostly  common across different product families.  B y  product 
architecture we refer to the “way in which components are integrated and liked together 
into a coherent whole” (Henderson and Clark, 1990: 2). 
 
3.1 Basic product layout 
Essentially a lawn/garden tractor is built around its frame.   The frame works as a “glue 
component” (see Ulrich and Ellison, 1998: 15) as various other components are attached 
to it.  The essential components that are  then needed to build a working tractor are 
engine  &  cooling  system,  transmission, ax les,  wheels, steering   system,  hydraulics, 
mower  deck lifting -engaging  system,  wire harness, dashboard &   console, and body  
parts such as hood and fender deck.  I n figure 3 the overall lay out of a lawn tractor  is 
illustrated, highlighting some of its key components. 
 
 
 3.2 Principles for generating product variants 
Unlike computers, cell-phones, industrial machinery, furniture and many other products 
where modularity is one of the main avenues to efficiently  generate product variants, 
this is not the case for lawn and garden tractors.  Most of the fundamental functions of a 
tractor, in fact, cannot be specifically traced to a certain component.  On other  words, it 
is often hard to achieve different performances just by  changing one component of the 
lawn tractor.  For example, we cannot swap a large mower deck over a tractor with a 
small engine, as the engine does not have sufficient power to drive the large mower 
deck.  If we change the engine we are l ikely to need a m ore powerful transmission as 
well.  If, instead, the engine is powerful enough, we have to make sure the frame should 
is long enough to take a larg e mower deck.  Many  other examples could be made to 
illustrate the complex interdependencies across components. 
 
Figure 3: Lawn/garden tractor and some key components 
 
4.  SUPPLY CHAIN STRUCTURE 
Schematically, we can g enerally depict the L awn Mower and Garden Tractor supply  
chain as a three-tier system including component manufacturers, assembly  plants and 
distribution centers/retailers.  Indeed, there are two different final assembly locations, 
one  focused on the mass market and one focused on the premium and  heavy-duty 
markets.  The plant serving the mass market is basically affected by the sole volume 
flexibility  requirement, as product variety   is very   low.  According ly,  it  has  been 
structured in such a way to implement various well-known techniques to deliver volume 
flexibility.   Our   focus,  instead,  is on he   plant  serving  the  premium  and  heavy-duty 
markets,  as  these  two markets face the simultaneous volume flex ibility  and mix  
flexibility challenge. 
 
 4.1 Components sourcing 
Component suppliers are located in very different geographical areas and they present a 
wide  variance in terms of barg aining  power vis-à-vis the L awn  Mower and Garden 
Tractor business group. 
The greater burden in component sourcing derives from the engine, as engine suppliers 
can hardly react very fast to unpredictable demand fluctuation  because of technological 
rigidities (castings) and operational complexity (building an engine entails making and 
assembling  a  great  number or parts).  I n  particular, hig h-end  Kawasaki eng ines  are 
imported from Japan, and they have a delivery lead time that can exceed several weeks.. 
As for the other key  component, the frame, it  is entirely made by a stamping plant 
owned by the same B usiness Group, so that ex pediting is possible.  Yet, ex pediting 
cannot be considered as a routine practice, as every time you expedite something you 
delay something else.  As a whole, the stamping  plant manages several thousand part 
numbers, as the tooling costs for a product family are very high: just the tooling  to 
stamp a steel fender deck may easily cost $ 1 million.  The stamping facility, which ties 
a lot of capital, was conceived to cut the costs of metal parts made in hig h volumes by 
means of stamping instead of welding.  Later in time it appeared the option of stamped 
plastic parts, and part volumes shrunk because of product proliferation. 
Most non-major components are sourced locally (same or nearby states) and for most of 
them the delivery time is within 3-5 weeks.  However, if the order goes up to second tier 
suppliers, delivery may take up to a few months.   In general, local suppliers are used to 
think in terms of volumes and batch siz es, and they designed an operational structure 
and infrastructure consistent with such logic. 
 
4.2 Final assembly 
Largely the factory shop floor was designed in the Eighties.  Final assembly plant layout 
is product-oriented.  Each product series is made on  a separate focused factory with the 
exception of LX/GT and LT/LTR.  Yields of assembly lines vary according with the 
specific family considered.  Roug hly output for hig h-yield lines is approx imately 200 
pieces per shift, while it goes down at 50 pieces per shift for the slower lines.  Each line 
has been designed to allow for some flexibility, meaning that it can build all the variant 
of its product family in a day. 
Automation is relatively intense in the operations preceding the assembly line.  Frames, 
mower decks, fender decks etc. are put together by welding robots in a series of welding 
booths.  Welded parts are then hooked to a roll bar and automatically driven to the paint 
shop, from which they return painted with the same system. 
Given the relative complexity of the product, line workers need training and appropriate 
documentation in order to be able to perform their job.  Such requirement is exacerbated 
by product proliferation, as worker have to be able to disting uish how the sequence of 
different  product  moving  down  the assembly   line affect the operations they   are performing.  Parts are moved to the assembly line mainly with forklift and move across 
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Figure 4: Schematic final assembly plant layout (LT product family) 
 
4.3 Distribution 
Downstream to final assembly is a central warehouse, which serves two basic functions.  
One, its original function, is to pile  up inventory in the low-season so that there is 
sufficient quantity of end items to meet market demand during high-season.  The second 
function is related to the fact that the plant under  study basically serves the premium 
and heavy-duty markets, which are not covered by discounts or home centers.  Hence, it 
has to buffer demand variation from specialty  shops and dealers from the factory .  Due 
to the aforementioned trend towards product proliferation, the principle of consolidating 
inventories in the central warehouse is exposing the company to serious financial and 
market liabilities.  In fact, ending up with unwanted stocks while hitting low order fill-
rates is the ultimate risk when a distribution structure has to handle a much higher 
product variety then the one it was originally designed to handle. 
 
5.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO IMPLEMENT BUILD-TO-ORDER 
Overall, John Deere Lawn and Garden B usiness Group is addressing  a very complex 
environmental challenge, that combines two major hurdles.  On the one side we have 
the  intrinsically  seasonal  nature  of  the  Lawn  and  Garden  Equipment  market,  which requires the company to inflate and deflate according to market dynamics.  On the other 
side,  we have the ty pical  problems  of  mass  customization,  namely  efficient  and 
effective delivery of product variety and product change. 
John Deere Lawn and Garden Business Group management screened a whole array of 
possible solutions to implement B TO, spanning different functional areas.  W e briefly 
recall them as follows. 
 
5.1 Component commonality/ Product platforms 
A first, obvious chance to increase the capability  of the firm of building  to order is 
component commonality.  When commonality includes the frame  and eventually other 
infrastructural components, such as the wire harness or the steering system, then we talk 
of product platforms. 
While  the benefits of product commonality   for rapid product chang e  and for mix  
flexibility are widely documented in the literature, we cannot say  the same for volume 
flexibility.   The effect of component commonality   on volume  flexibility  is  indirect.  
Component commonality reduces the total setup time across the supply  chain, so that a 
larger percentage of available time is actually devoted to production.  According ly, if 
we assume that building the common component requires approximately the same time 
that is needed on average to build any of the non-common component it substitutes, we 
can conclude that – ceteris paribus – component commonality allows for increasing the 
maximum theoretical production output. 
The practice communizing components is not necessarily as easy and straightforward as 
the literature is sometimes suggesting.  First of all, there may be a number of technical 
problems.  For example, the same frame, let’s say for “premium market” tractors should 
be compatible with different eng ine mounts and with different transmissions.  W hen a 
technical problem is overcome there may be a cost problem.  F or example, having a 
common frame through all a set of families would imply having an over-sized frame for 
the  less  powerful  and  durable models.  I n  addition, it may   be hard to prove the 
advantage of component commonality across families if the accounting system does not 
explicitly consider the costs of complexity related to managing a higher overall number 
of  component  across a set of product families.  Sometimes for issues of product 
consistency or pride engineers prefer to design a new components rather than  trying to 
adapt their design to use an already existing component.  Finally, marketing may oppose 
component standardization on the basis that  it negatively affects customers’ perception 
of the company product offer. 
 
5.2 Supplier flexibility 
Given the fact that most components are purchased by  suppliers, their flexibilization is 
indeed critical.  Undoubtedly, end product variety tends to migrate upstream the supply 
chain, so that suppliers too are affected by  component proliferation.  A first imperative, therefore, is to inc rease suppliers mix-flexibility.  However, what appears to be the 
major concern on the supply side is volume flexibility.  Were John Deere to react Build-
To-Order to market demand, the supply chain has to do that too. 
At present, one of the major ideas contemplated by  the Business Group management is 
to help key suppliers replicate the same logic discussed before.  By increasing mix 
flexibility they can indirectly increase volume flexibility. 
It is unclear whether such kind of approach can relieve suppliers from the need to bear 
significant inventories before seasonal peak.  To ma ke things more difficult, certain 
suppliers have the power to refuse to keep inventories, such as  engine suppliers.  In 
addition, for different suppliers there may  be different  approaches to achieve volume 
flexibility, depending on the product and production technology. 
 
5.3 Assembly flexibility  
As observed in section 5.2, final assembly plant mirrors a focused factory approach and 
a level of automation that may have been more appropriate at the time when the plant 
was  conceived.    Now,  the  impossibility  to r econfigure  in r easonable  time  and  at 
reasonable cost an assembly line from a product family to another is a major obstacle to 
both volume an mix flexibility.  Volume flexibility may be increased by diverting to 
unsaturated  product  lines  demand  exceeding  a g iven  assembly  line capacity .   Mix  
flexibility, meant as the capability  to build any  product on any line without excessive 
setup costs, may then allow for volume flexibility referred to a specific product family. 
Reconciling mix flexibility and volume flexibility may in this case require a careful 
standardization of the interface between the product and the  assembly line, so that the 
same assembly line can, ideally, process any product model.  It is important to note that 
certain  solutions f or  increasing  the  theoretical  capacity  of  the  assembly  line  and its 
volume flexibility may negatively affect mix flexibility.  Such approaches as Design For 
Manufacturing, for example, try to cut assembly time by reducing the part count of the 
products.  Reducing the part count of the products requires integ rating different parts 
into one or less parts.  Unfortunately, when different parts are consolidated into a sing le 
one, we may loose commonalities across different products.  I f we have sufficiently  
high  volumes for such consolidated part, the benefits  of  simplified  assembly  may 
outweigh the cost of part proliferation.  However, if volumes are lower, as it ty pically 
happens in presence of product proliferation, then a lower  part count is more important 
than  a fast er  assembly.   I n  other  words, t here  may  be a t rade  off bet ween  volume 
flexibility and mix flexibility. 
 
5.4 Workforce flexibility 
As for the workforce is concerned, two possible directions for flexibility improvement 
are  being  considered.   One   the  one  side,  the  need  for  workforce  flexibility  can  be 
reduced,  for ex ample  by  simplifying  assembly  operations.  As we just  discussed, assembly work simplification cannot be performed by  just reducing part count, as  this 
may lead to missing commonalities.  A possible  approach, instead, may be to design 
different parts in such a way that the assembly process, i.e. how do they actually fit with 
the other parts, is standardiz ed.  No matter a g iven part may vary, the worker’s  task 
would be exactly the same. 
On the other side, greater training may be needed.  In this case, the firm is working with 
unions in order to define appropriate agreements that may allow the firm to retain well-
trained workers, even though they are not actually working the whole year.   
 
5.5 Form postponement 
Another potential approach to build to order is form postponement.  Also in this case its 
implementation is not as straightforward as it may appear from the literature.  Form 
postponement  may  be  applied  at  in different points of the supply   chain.  Product 
variety-generating activities performed by suppliers may be, for example, performed at 
the final assembly plant.  For ex ample, instead of soldering on the frame the different 
supports  for the eng ine  at stamping   plant, such  supports  could  be  bolted  at  final 
assembly plant, at the beginning of assembly line.  The benefit for stamping plant would 
be  a  higher  repetitiveness  in f rame  manufacturing  and,  hence  higher  capacity  and 
volume  flexibility.    Implementing  form postponement more downstream the supply  
chain  may  be  not  that  easy.   F or  example,  a  possibility  may  be  to pe rform  certain 
product differentiation activities at the central warehouse.  I ndeed, this would imply 
building a factory in the warehouse, duplicating  a number of resources such as people, 
equipment and floor space.  I n addition, such resources would  be affected by the same 
seasonality problems of upstream operations.  Going  further down the supply chain, it 
may be that dealers perform some product differentiation.  This is clearly impossible for 
discounts and home centers.  As for specialty  stores and dealers, they already perform 
some basic customization, like installing certain attachments.  However, increasing the 
breadth of customization activities would imply having higher components inventories 
in retail stores, which is not seem as very practicable.  Finally, the idea that the end 
consumer customizes the product by  himself is even more unpractical, as working  on 
the tractor requires skill, tools, and experience. 
 
5.6 Forecast reliability ranking 
As many informants put it clearly, a full build-to-order capability is not really feasible 
given the huge seasonal variations of this business.  Something will have to be built to 
forecast and stored for seasonal peak.  A potential solution to reduce the inventory risk 
may  be to rank forecasts based on their  reliability,  so  that  only  the  most  reliable 
forecasts drive actual inventory build-up.  Items characterized by more uncertain market 
demand may be going to be built-to-order. 
Commitment from marketing here becomes crucial.   In fact, forecast reliability is not 
only a matter of different historical variances for demand of different items.  Forecast reliability can be selectively increased for certain items if marketing commits to support 
with appropriate promotion such items.  Therefore, an appropriate coordination between 
marketing and production planning may indeed smooth some of the uncertainty. 
 
5.7 Demand management 
A more advanced approach to build-to-order may be to alter demand, or to chang e the 
time  when fi nal  demand  materializes.  For ex ample,  customers  may  get  incentive  to 
order off-season, or there may be pre-season promotions may be offered.  Alternatively, 
the company may try to trade customization, or some sort of discount, for  fast delivery.  
In this way, product availability may become less important for customers, as they  may 
be less interested in getting the product immediately , if they can get it really as they 
like.  The important assumption behind this kind of approach is that customers  really 
care about product customization, which, as we saw, is not true for all customers. 
 
5.8 Disciplined product change 
A final area of potential improvement toward  Build-To-Order is to perform product 
change in a time-phased manner, so that it does not interfere with seasonal peak.  Most 
product changes, in fact, may be concentrated in periods where the  supply chain is not 
strained  by  the  spring  production peak, with the ex ception  of safety-related  product 
changes.  Most  of t he  changes,  indeed  are com manded  by  either  marketing  or 
engineering because of technical or competitive issues, thus locking precious resources.  
Of course imposing such kind of “disciplined product chang e” is not easy  as it g oes 
against  thee  unwritten  “power  hierarchy”  of  the  company:  marketing  first,  than 
engineering and then supply chain. 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Meeting  the  joint r equirement  for  mix  and  volume  flexibility  is a   very  demanding 
objective.  The present preliminary  exploration of this problem hig hlights clearly the 
fact  that,  while  these  two  goals  may  display  some  mutual  trade-off,  they  may  be 
synergistic as well. 
Increasing volume flexibility essentially means increasing capacity without increasing 
fixed  costs.    Accordingly,  every  action  aimed  at  increasing  operational  efficiency 
without  tying  capital in fix ed  assets, tang ible  or intang ible,  is  increasing  volume 
flexibility.  Techniques aimed at increasing mix-flexibility may be considered as a way 
to reduce resources consumed to switch across different  product variants.  Therefore, as 
mix-flexibility captures a specific resource-sparing approach, it indirectly contributes to 
increase theoretical capacity for a given level of product variety within a manufacturing 
system.  Most important, to the extent that mix-flexibility is achieved without increasing 
fixed costs, it positively affects volume flexibility. 
Before turning this implicit proposition into a full-blown theory or joint mix and volume 
flexibility reduction, much remains to be done.  First of all, we expect to observe what 
actual decision will be taken by  John Deere to address such challeng e, as well as their 
operational outcomes.  Then, we believe that the same phenomenon will have  to be 
studied in other settings as well, so that other significant independent or context variable 
may eventually included in our theorizing effort.  Needless to say, we believe that an 
eventual theory of Build-To-Order, i.e. of joint volume and mix flexibility reduction, 
will necessarily have to undergo a large scale test.  
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